17th Bomb Group

The following story is copied from the Official History of the 452nd Bomb Wing (L) for December 1950.

Jim Franklin

LTC USAF(Ret.)

730th Bomb Squadron 452nd Bomb Wing (L/NI)

As we left the Briefing room on the late afternoon of July 30, 1951, we were grumbling a little on the mission assignment for the night. The Mission - Armed reconnaissance of the Purple 11 area of North Korea. This meant another hard night in the far Northwest corner of North Korea at the mouth of the Yalu River, attacking targets of opportunity in the Sinuiju/Uiju area. This area was otherwise known as FLAK ALLEY and we had flown a mission in the same area the night before. We had attracted considerable anti-aircraft fire and were,naturally, a little gun-shy.

Being an experienced crew, having flown over 30 missions in B-26 aircraft in both day and night armed reconnaissance, we knew our grumbling was useless. We went to plan our mission and agreed, based on our experience the night before, that entering the target from the Southeast was hazardous to our health. So, we were going to outsmart the Wily Chinese. Instead of penetrating the target area from the Southeast, the normal way in, we would attack from the West, over Korea Bay. A secondary consideration was, although the weather in the target area was predicted to be clear, enroute weather in Central North Korea was predicted to be very bad.

So, there it was : The Mission-Armed Night Reconnaissance of the Purple 11 area, attacking targets of opportunity. Armed Night Reconnaissance being officialize for armed to the teeth and looking for trouble.

(Little did we know !!---) 

The aircraft- B-26C Invader. Armament- Six wing mounted, forward firing, .50 caliber Machine guns, two 100 Gallon Napalm bombs, one under each wing, ten 2601b. Fragmentation Bombs in the bomb bay, and four .50 caliber Machine guns, mounted in a ball turret, two up and two down, aft of the bomb bay. The crew- 1st Lt. Loren Davis-Pilot, 2d Lt. Jim Franklin-Navigator /Bombardier, SSgt. Jim Heslop- Ball Turret Gunner.

We departed K-9 Airbase (Pusan East) at 18:30 hrs, 30 July 1951. and proceeded North, enroute to the bombline penetration point near Kaesong, North Korea. Enroute weather was as predicted, ROTTEN ! Cruising at 8000 ft., we were in intermittent rain, some turbulence, and zero visibility.

After bomb line penetration, we continued North about 20 minutes then turned West, heading for the Yellow Sea. There being no navigational aids, all positions were based on dead reckoning and preflight weather information. We flew West for a period of time and then began to descend when our estimated position was over water. As we finally broke out of the clouds at 2500 ft., it was apparent that the predicted winds, given to me at weather briefing that afternoon, were not very good. We were still over land, at 2500 ft., in an area that had 3000 ft. mountains! Fortunately, I recognized our location, just South of Sariwon, and took corrective action to adjust our flight path and correct the calculations based on real winds. It looked as if this was not going to be our night!

Continuing on our planned route, we soon crossed the coastline and turned Northwest for the mouth of the Yalu River.The weather cleared and we began to feel better about this mission. Everything was going well as the islands at the mouth of the Yalu River soon appeared and we turned inland to attack a convoy of vehicles going South from Sinuiju. All the bombs were armed, guns test fired, and we were ready to engage!

When we passed over a small town called Namsi-dong, all Hell broke loose! Searchlights!! No one had briefed us that searchlights were in this area!! We were pinned by six or eight searchlights, accompanied by anti-aircraft fire from, what appeared to be, all directions!! What to do?!! Pinned like a moth in a candle flame and being swatted at by very angry Chinese!

Our reaction was very swift. We attacked! Rolling into the searchlights and attacking them was our only alternative. The searchlight operators and anti-aircraft gunners on the ground thought they had a moth in their sights, but soon discovered that they had a hornet! Strafing as we went in kept the anti-aircraft gunner's heads down long enough for us to deliver two or three 2601b. fragmentation bombs. As we pulled up off the targets, our ball turret gunner proceeded to hose them down with .50 caliber machine gun fire from both his top and bottom turrets, disrupting the anti-aircraft fire, enabling us to turn around and attack them again from the other direction! We continued this method of attack until all the lights were out and the anti-aircraft fire was suppressed.

Since we had not expended all our ordnance, and were still operating on pure adrenalin, our interrupted attack on the vehicle convoy was pressed! After all our ordnance was expended, leaving a convoy burning, and dangerously low on fuel, we decided that it was time to go HOME!!

Later that night, as we were sitting in the debriefing room sipping our Old Methusalah, we had a hard time convincing the Intelligence Debriefing Officer that we really had encountered searchlights in the area of Namsi-dong. No one else had reported searchlights in this area!! And, as far as we knew, no one ever reported Searchlights in the area again-----!!

After over 50 years, if I'm sitting in a darkened room and someone turns on all the bright lights suddenly, my mind still does an instant replay of the night of our Illuminating Experience over Namsi-dong!

Jim Franklin

On the 25th of June 1951 we trooped into the briefing room and checked the mission board. We were on the board for an Armed Recon of the Purple 5 route and scheduled to take a B-26B, tail number 552, Myakinass. We liked this old bird because it had 14 forward firing .50 calibers and 4 more, two up and two down, in a lower turret. The crew was 1st Lt. Loren Davis, Pilot, 2nd Lt. Jim Franklin, Navigator/Bombardier, and Sgt. James Heslop, Gunner. We liked to fly together because we had flown together many times before and we got the job done. We were armed with 2 napalm tanks on the wing pylons, an internal bomb bay loaded with 8-M76 WP incendiary bombs, and with 5400 rounds of .50 cal. API, we were loaded for bear!

The mission briefer covered all the missions that were going up that night and said that the Chinese had "returned to the negotiating table at Panmunjon," and we could expect a lot of traffic that night because any time they began negotiating they usually started a massive resupply to their frontline positions. We went to an individual mission planning briefing and were set up to interdict some of that resupply activity on Purple 5. Purple 5 was the main supply route from the Yalu River to the front lines running along a river and twisting through a lot of mountains northeast of Pyongyang. Hairy flying at night with a B-26 at low level.

We went out to the flight line and preflighted the aircraft at about sundown and then grabbed a fast supper and a cup or two of hot and black. Back to the aircraft, pulled the bomb pins, and finished the preflight. Off the ground at about 2030 hrs. we flew up to the bomb line penetration point and test fired the guns when we were in enemy territory for sure. It was very black out and we flew northwest until we were in the Purple 5 area. A little north of Yangdok, North Korea, we spotted a line of truck lights strung out for miles! We went in on it, dropping down from 5000 ft. cruising altitude to about 3000 ft. We had developed a strategy from flying together, where we would attack the head of the convoy first and start the attack from there. (Yangdok was a BAD flak area – Editor) We kicked off a napalm and hit dead on, then did a fast 180 and proceeded to strafe them from the head of the convoy toward the rear. We picked up a lot of Antiaircraft fire from truck mounted 20mm and 30mm. As we pulled up from the strafing run, Sgt. Heslop kept their heads down with the turret guns. Then we dropped the other napalm at the tail end of the line of vehicles. We had them bottled up! We went up and down that convoy strafing and dropping the M-76 firebombs.

Trucks were driving off the road and into the river, burning and exploding all along the route. I kept my eye on the altitude while Davis did his strafing. We were bombing and strafing right on the deck with 3000 ft. mountains all around us, so knowing where we were and how high was a must. As we ran out of bombs and .50 cal., I did a fast fuel calculation and found out we were critically low. We headed for the bomb line and home. By my estimate, there were at least 40 trucks burning when we left. That was one convoy of fuel and ammunition that would never be used against our troops on the frontlines!

I plotted the most direct route to the nearest field and we headed for Suwon (K-4) on auto lean. We arrived at K-4 and the airfield was blacked out. We asked the tower why and they said that "Bed Check Charlie" had been visiting and they had blacked out the runway lights, etc. We declared a fuel emergency and they grudgingly turned on the runway lights long enough for us to line up and land. We taxied into a parking position and requested immediate refueling and rearming. Our plan was to rearm and refuel and go back up to Purple 5 and finish the job on that convoy. While Sgt. Heslop and I took care of the servicing of the aircraft, Davis went up to their Command Post to get JOC permission for a restrike. We had gotten the aircraft refueled and were rearming it with 100 lb. GP bombs (all that were available) and .50 cal. ammo. Then Davis got back. JOC would not give us clearance for a turnaround restrike.

We downloaded the bombs, apologized to the armament crew, and took off for K-9. We flew by K-2 on our way home and I called the 67th TRS and requested strike photos of our target area from the 67th TAC Recon Squadron. They said they would try to launch a Blackbird and I gave them the exact co-ordinates of the target area. We landed well after midnight, went in to debriefing and told our tale. We were very hyped and I had a hard time getting to sleep, even after several good shots of Old Methuselah.

The next day I was rousted from the sack by the Duty Officer and told to report to the Wing CO's Office ASAP. I thought to myself, this is going to be a royal chewing out for our attempt to do a turnaround restrike out of K-4. When I got to Wing HQ., I saw Loren Davis and Jim Heslop talking to Colonel Lawhon and everyone was smiling. Good sign that it wasn't a chewing out. We were decorated with Distinguished Flying Crosses! The 67th Photo Interpreters had confirmed 34 trucks destroyed and a lot of damaged vehicles as well. JOC was very happy with the Truck Busters of K-9.

A little side note on this story. When we taxied in to park at Suwon, we stopped and opened the bomb bay doors and the top of a tree fell out on the ground, Sgt. Heslop picked it up and asked Pilot Davis, "What about this?" We each kept a piece of it for luck. In over 20 years of transferring all over the world, mine was lost, but, as they say, "DFC's don’t grow On Trees", or do they?

Col. Brooks A. Lawson, left, commander of the 452nd Bomb Wing Congratulates one of his B-26 night intruder crews which recently blasted 50 heavily laden Communist Supply trucks found in the deep mountain pass far in Far North Korea. Repeated bombing and strafing passes accounted for the destruction of 46 trucks and damage to the remainder of the convoy. Receiving DFCs for this exceptional feat are, left to right, Lt Loren W. Davis, pilot, Lt James G Franklin, navigator, and Sgt James Heslop, gunner

Dennis E. Davis

Having just finished survival training in northern California, we were tasked with bringing a B-26 to the Far East. We picked up a bird at McClellan AFB that had just been through DIR. In order to make the long first leg, Sacramento to Honolulu, we first had to ensure that the plane would not exceed 90 gallons per hour fuel usage at 150 knots.

Weather was critical for that first leg - the forecast had to be no worse than 20 knots headwind. Six of us headed out on a lovely October morning in a loose formation on a C-54 that served as the navigation guide. Since our navigator detested the B-26 (due to his height) he elected to ride the C-54 and I got to ride the right seat. Since that B-26 had no relief tubes one of my principal duties was to supervise the various cups of yellow liquid that began to accumulate on the floor.

Enroute it became apparent that the forecast was off, and that fuel would be critical. We and three others made Hickam OK, one had to stop on Molakai, and one just ran out of fuel so the crew bailed out. With the resultant disarray we were in Hawaii for a few days before pressing on. In the BX at Hickham I saw the navigator from the "splashed" B-26, whose head was swathed in bandages. I asked "What happened?" He replied "Remember, at Langley they told us in a bail- out situation crouch down and dive for the right nacelle, because if you try to stand you'll go right over the top and remove the VHF antenna with your head? Well, those instructors were absolutely right!"

After that each further leg was rather routine - Hawaii to Midway, Midway to Wake, Wake to Iwo Jima, Iwo Jima to Tokyo. It was an unforgettable sight to view the sunken ships through the clear waters around Midway and Wake, to smile at the gooney birds on Midway, to poke through the overgrown bunkers on Iwo and salute the flagpole atop Mt. Suribachi.

We dropped our plane in Tokyo and went on to Korea. Quite a bit of work was necessary to remove the ferry tank, etc. and install the guns and bomb racks. When our trans-Pac bird finally showed up, it went to another squadron much to my regret. In April 53 the return flight to the States was much quicker but not nearly as interesting.

Bill Young

Crew Chief of "My Mary, Lou "

95th Squadron- Korea

There has been a lot of flap recently about the bent propellers on several planes at K-9. How could they bend forward, backward, or simply grind the ends off as happened to My Mary Lou.

If you look at an Invader siting empty on the tarmac, you will see the prop tips are about eighteen inches from the ground, much lower than the fuselage Load the plane and you can get them as low as eight inches. In any wheels up landing the props will hit the ground first.

I'm not a pilot, but as I've seen during many take-off runs, the tail is generally lowered and the nose is raised. If the gear is "snatched" early and the plane mushes, and the props touch the runway, they will strike the backside of the prop and thus bend forward. If they touch with the nose slightly low, they will strike the front of the prop and bend backward. If they touch in level flight they will simply grind the tips off, as happened on My Mary Lou. I realize that this is a simple explanation but perhaps it will clarify this subject.

Also, our A-26's were real sliders. The bottom of the fuselage was flat (almost) and sat lower than the engine nacelles. On a wheels-up landing on level ground, when the props stopped flailing around and Invader will level up and slide like a toboggan.

I witnessed this at K-9 when a transit Invader (probably from the 3rd Bomb Wing) had a nose gear collapse. It simply settled down and came sliding serenely by My Mary Lou's revetment, which I was occupying, some fifty yards away! My first impulse was to "down-load" my pants, but as usual, I hit the wrong key and instead, grabbed a 75-pound fire extinguisher and ran to the front of the plane.

The crew was just sitting there in the plane glaring at each other and at their newly found environment, as if marveling at how close the turf was to their tush. I asked, "Are you Okay?" One nodded his head as if to say yes. Then I told the pilot to cut off the magneto and battery switches and get the hell out of thc plane. It only took a split-second for them to exit the plane.

They seemed to be unhurt so I re-assumed my role as fire extinguisher carrier and returned to my chores at My Mary Lou's revetment.

More on Curled Props

Jim Hogue

37th Squadron Korea

I wish to add a few words of elucidation on the curled props at K-9.

No one gave any reason as to the cause, it being that we had a colossal bump near the midpoint in the runway, give or take a few feet. With a good wind coming in from the ocean, it was possible to get somewhat airborne at that point. Most of the time with the bomb loads we had, the plane would settle back down and complete the takeoff run until over the beach. I 'm sure most of the pilots will recall the jump-going-over-the-hump at K-9.

The pilots of the curled prop jobs must have popped the gear handle up on the first jump and then settled back down for a second bounce. They must have had to run high power settings to keep the airspeed needed to stay airborne. Anyway, it shows the old R-2800s could really take it.

Another interesting phenomenon was a bull session about taking off with a bomb load and having the wing flaps down fully at the 52-degree mark.

After much profound discussion, a Lt. Jackson admitted it was very possible as he had accomplished it The usual flap check was to run them full down, then back up to 20 deg for takeoff. Somehow the raising to 20 deg was overlooked and takeoff began. With the stiff on-shore blast, his plane began raising like an elevator at about stall speed. Not knowing the reason for the extra lift. he kept going and had 300 altitude at the end of the runway. As the navigator in the right seat began bringing up the flaps, he then noticed the indicator in the full down position. They then began getting some airspeed and less lift so all went well and the mission was completed.

Note:

I know that some will wonder how you can pull the gear up while still making a take off run, because the"squat switches"( we call them WOW=Weight on Wheels now) will indicate that the gear struts are not extended and will not allow the gear to come up. Some pilots called it a "Fighter Take Off"- You override the safety plunger and put the gear handle in the "Retract" position. When the aircraft becomes airborne, the struts extend, the squat switches activate and allow the gear to retract. Unfortunately the runway at K-9 was less than smooth. During my tenure at K-9. a pilot performed this take off, only about half way down the run way the A/C hit a bump and rose enough to activate the squat switches. The gear came up, the A/C settled with the right wing low. The props just touched the runway. The pilot continued on the mission and it was only upon his return did he discover that the tips of the left prop were ground off, and the tips on the right prop were bent forward enough that you could stand on them. The pilot claimed that he did not know that he had hit the runway - though he admitted feeling a "little" extra vibration during flight.

17th Bomb Wing Commander Missing In Action

Fifth Air Force headquarters announced yesterday that Colonel Glenn C. Nye, 17th Bomb Wing Commander, is missing in action.

Colonel Nye and his crew of three failed to return from a combat mission over North Korea on Oct. 7. His A-26 Invader was bit by enemy flak during a daylight strike on a Communist supply area. Eyewitnesses reported that the aircraft, leading a six-plane formation, was hit in the left engine and spiraled out of the formation just before bombs were dropped. The A-26 exploded on impact behind some hills. No parachutes were observed and no friendly or enemy activity in the area was seen by the other crews, who descended to an altitude of 75 feet over the scene of the crash. Other crewmembers were :

• Lt. William J. Bell, navigator, 34th Bomb Squadron
• Lt. Herbert Pincus, bombardier, 34th Bomb Squadron
• Corporal William H. Vanwey, gunner 37th Bomb Squadron

Colonel Nye, of Champaign, Ill., has been commander of the 17th Bomb Wing since June of this year.

More about Colonel Nye

Tom Semans

34th Squadron

I have a couple of corrections. They are in the spirit that whatever gets put down in print becomes official history and is copied and recopied as such. Therefore it is important to get details correct.

 

Colonel Glen C. Nye did not take a direct flak hit over Wonson. It was on 7 Oct 52 and somewhere more in the central part of North Korea. I was flying number six on the right of the second echelon of three ships each, and saw the flak walk right by my left side and into his engine. A check of my Form 5 shows a daylight mission (that 's how I can pinpoint it) on 7 Oct 52 to Kukchong. You may be able to locate that. You may recall that we did not always have the exact geographical names and even sometimes just made up funny names. I assume that since I was only carrying my gunner that mission, that the destination was derived from the intelligence debriefing. At any rate, it was definitely in the interior of North Korea and not Wonson. Also, we did take off loaded to the North (Runway 35 is my hazy recollection) and turned left to about 210 degrees as we passed Peter Nan Homer that was a very short distance North of the runway.

This was also the missed approach procedure. I do know that I did it at least two times -scary.

---

More about Colonel Nye

R. E. Reynolds

34th Squadron

I can relate to the URC-4 "Emergency Radio", Our crew carried two on each mission. Usually the navigator and the gunner wore the vest. However, the vest we wore contained both the radio and a battery in pockets under the arms. A bit uncomfortable, but it worked. We tried the radios like you did and I don't recall any problems with them, except being bulky to wear.

You asked if anyone recalls the loss of Colonel Glenn C. Nye. The Colonel was leading a six-plane daylight formation and had three other men with him. One of my best friends from the 37th Bomb Squadron was on board that fateful day, Corporal William H. Vanwey of Ponca City, OK.I do not recall the names of the lead navigator or the lead bombardier at this time. Although I was assigned to the 34th Bomb Squadron, I was asked to oversee the packing of Bill's things for return to his family. It was a very sad assignment for an 18-year old. Bill had an older brother in the Army that was KIA a few months before we arrived in Korea. A s I recall, there was considerable discussion about the loss. My understanding is they were hit by flak in or near the left engine. Communications from the aircraft said, " Don't follow us down, we are okay." No parachutes were seen. I have seen the names of all four air man engraved in the "Pacific Punch Bowl" cemetery in Hawaii. It would nice if crew members from the other five aircraft came forward and explained what actually occurred that day.

You also mentioned a firefight at K -9 's perimeter. I remember the event. We were returning from a mission when the tower informed us of a skirmish progress at the West end of the fields perimeter. As we still had hot wing guns, my pilot offered assistance, but was turned down. The tower cleared us to land with caution as we had to taxi by the area in question to our hard stand. Once on the ground we opened the cockpit clamshell canopy for a breath of fresh air only to hear the noise of the, machine guns over the din of the engines. It was scary to be returning from a mission over North Korea only to find more fighting at your home field.

Follow On Information

The following information was obtained from the microfilm history reports of the 17th Bomb Wing on file at the Air Force History Research Agency Maxwell AFB

History of the 17th BW (L) 1 July 52 through 31 Dec 52 Document number 1-AF-D2

Under 34th Bomb Squadron history:

• 6 October 1952
• A/C # 44-35407 lost as a result of enemy action
• Crew:
  • Colonel Glen C Nye - pilot - Commander, 17th Bomb Wing (L)
  • 2nd Lt William J Bell - navigator, 34th Bomb Squadron (L/NI)
  • 1st Lt. Herbert Pincus - bombardier, 34th Bomb Squadron (L/NI)

  Colonel Nye, the Wing Commander was leading a daylight formation at the time.

  Note:

  • This date appears to be incorrect
  • There is no mention of the gunner (presumably because he was not assigned to the 34th Squadron)

In Appendix B - 37th Bomb Squadron (appendix B to the 17th BW history)

• 7 October - Combat Loss - A/2C William H. Vanway gunner-engineer (flying as crew member with Col. Nye on a daylight formation mission)

Note: A/2C Vanway is correctly identified as an A/2C, not as a corporal as reported in the Stars and Stripes

 A/2C William Vanway

Robert A. Pruett

37th Squadron -17th Bomb Wing Korea

In August 1952, Langley Field was an extremely hot and humid place. Despite the heat and humidity I was looking forward to meeting my pilot, Captain Al Beasley and the navigator/bombardier, Captain Ralph Kelly. After our training at Langley -(remember those RBG missions at Plum Tree Island?) -we departed on our 30-day leave, to be reunited in Reno, Nevada, -man what a life -for survival training at Stead AFB. Then on to Japan and eventually we arrived at K-9 Korea.

 

On December 31, 1952, I was scheduled for a flight physical. While getting my physical, Al, Ralph, and one of the crew chiefs, Sgt. (name unknown)departed K-9 on a training mission. Upon their return Al landed somewhat short of the runway (about 1000 feet) causing the nose and right main gear to collapse. The plane came to a stop about 1800 feet down the runway. Fortunately there were no injuries. Ralph said he thought it was impossible to sweat in those cold temperatures, but he did, and profusely. And about crashing the plane, Al said it was not only embarrassing but was extremely difficult to taxi. In all fairness, a post crash flight physical revealed that Al's depth perception was very bad and had not been detected in a previous physical. Al was grounded and became our Squadron Adjutant. Ralph and I then became "bastard " aircrew members. Meanwhile, I was grounded and sent to Japan for minor surgery. In a few weeks I returned to K-9 and was placed back on flying status.

Finally, a battle order was posted scheduling me for that infamous "dollar ride. " I was not familiar with the pilot and navigator but Glenn Hopkins was the gunner and I knew him. So I talked with Glenn and asked him what I should expect. He indicated that this should be a good mission, to use a WW II phrase "a milk run." This was to be the pilot and navigator/bombardier's 50th and last mission. We attended the afternoon briefing. I can 't recall much about the briefing or our take-off time, but I remember that we were assigned to Red Routes 13, 14&15. I figured we'd probably would fly just inside enemy territory, salvo the bomb load, turn south, go home and get started with the celebration. Hopkins and I returned to the barracks and I was feeling pretty good. Well, for those of who knew Lt. Abart, the pilot and Lt. Mounsell the navigator/bombardier, you can guess that I was to get one big surprise.

We departed K-9 in a glass nose ship, Hopkins was in the right seat and I rode in the jump seat, we flew up north and checked in with the controller, Mike Roger. The crew was very nice; they pointed out checkpoints and gave me some good tips about things that I should be on the lookout for. Glenn instructed me on my duties when I would be flying up front in the right seat. They told me about the "bomb line" as we crossed it and went from light to darkness. The ground was still covered with snow but there was some moonlight so we could see the ground, roads, mountains, etc. As we flew into North Korea, I kept waiting for Abart to open the bomb bay doors, salvo the load and go home. However, I didn 't know the story about Abart. He was known as the "Tiger " of The Tiger Squadron.

We had not traveled into North Korea very far when we started receiving ground fire. I'm not sure if it was Glenn or Mounsell that yelled "break left." Abart stood that "ole 26 " on its left wing tip and after using some expletives, he said he saw where the ground fire came from. He came around in a 360-degree turn until he got where he wanted to be and went into a steep dive. Those "golf balls" kept coming at us but Abart stayed right on target. I thought he was going to strafe them but he pulled up and dropped two five hundred-pound bombs. I don't know if we hit them but they stopped firing at us and didn't fire any more while we were in that area. We remained in that area for a while and Abart continued to strafe and bomb anything that resembled a truck or a storage building. Not locating many targets in that area, Abart said, "let's go over to Wonson and see if we can find something over there. " I do not remember if Wonson was in one of the Red Routes or not but we ended up there. We came in from north of the Wonson area and immediately spotted a truck traveling south. Abart started his strafing run and was popping API 's all around that truck. He just kept going down and I thought, "if he doesn't pull up we're going to crash right into that damn truck," just as he started pulling out of the dive it blew up right in front of us. By this time I was feeling a little nauseated, well, the truth is, I was sick. We continued to work the Wonson area until all our bombs and ammo were expended, then headed for home. Mounsell crawled back into the tunnel and opened a bottle of champagne. I declined a cup but Abart suggested I try some, "it might settle your stomach " and believe it or not, it did: We got back to K-9 okay and after debriefing the Base PI0 (or somebody) wanted a picture of the crew. We finished with the "photo-op,"went to "midnight chow" and to bed for much needed sleep and "settling" of the nerves.

So much for a "milk run. " Looking back, and remembering subsequent missions, I can easily come to the conclusion that if this was not the best mission I flew it certainly would tie with the best one which was the last-a daylight formation raid into the "Iron Triangle" on June 15, 1953.

Now, to get to the real purpose in writing this article. Late on a Sunday afternoon in January 2000, my wife handed me the phone and said, "someone wants to talk to you."  I'll not go into the details of our conversation but in a short period of time I learned that I was talking to Mike Hopkins, son of Glenn Hopkins, the gunner that taught me some tricks of the trade on that first "dollar ride." Apparently Glenn had kept the picture that was taken the night Abart & Mounsell completed their 50th mission, and through the years he and his son Mike would look at the picture and talk about that and other missions he flew. Mike told me that when he and his Dad looked at that picture Glenn would always ask, "I wonder whatever happened to Old Pruett?"  Unfortunately, Glenn passed away in 1995 and we never saw each other after our tour of duty in Korea. I regret very much that Glenn and I didn't have the opportunity to see and talk with each other after returning to the States. However, his son Mike didn't give up, and I 'm thankful he didn't. Since that conversation in January 2000 I've learned that Mike has the lower part of his house filled with pictures, medals, 37th Squadron coffee cup, an Air Force helmet, and other items from the 17th Bomb Wing at K-9. Mike has done this to memorialize his father, but he wants every veteran of the Korean War to be remembered and especially those veterans of the 17th Bomb Wing in Korea. Mike has gone beyond "the call of duty" in locating members of the 17th Bomb Wing and putting them in touch with the 17th Bomb Group/Wing Reunion Association. I know that Mike has received two awards for locating the most members of the Korean War 17th and I 'm sure he wants nothing for his efforts except the pleasure he gets when he is successful in locating airmen that served with the 17th Bomb Wing in Korea.

I want to commend Mike and thank him for persevering in his efforts to contact me. Since that phone call in January 2000 I've been in touch with quite a few of those "good old boys " whom I was with back in Korea during 1952-53: people like Tony Fucci, Jack Graybill, 0 B Anderson, C. 0. Smith, Bill Ubinger, Bob Cochran, John Deptha, and others that I met at the 2000 reunion. After having forgotten the "Forgotten War," it's really great to be able to see these guys from time to time and talk about those "dollar rides" and the other experiences we shared in Korea.

SO THANKS MIKE HOPKINS - AND KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK

Frank Moyer

729th Squadron - 452nd Bomb Wing Korea 

I thoroughly enjoy each issue of The Sortie. Many articles bring back memories of my year with the old 729th Squadron at Victorville, Itzazuke, Miho, and finally at K-9 "Pusan East." Last night I watched several episodes on the History Channel of their series Korea: Fire and Ice. More memories! Today, March 12, 2001, is the 33rd anniversary of my 100th and final F-105 Wild Weasel mission over North Vietnam -an event, which I often doubted I'd live to see! In waxing a bit nostalgic, I thought you might be interested in the following extract from some thoughts and experiences I've accumulated over the years.

In retrospect I've concluded that there are just two good things which can result from war. First, it gives a man a completely unique way of discovering just how much of a man he really is -or how much he may be lacking. Second, it often develops in one a tremendous respect for the other man and his job in his branch of the Service.

On Thanksgiving Day 1950, the Chinese Army opened a major offensive against American troops, mainly the 1st Marine Division and 7th Army Division. Where these units were trapped, near the Chosin Reservoir in northeastern Korea, the terrain was formidable, the winter weather the coldest of the decade. To make matters worse, a thick weather front lay along the coastal region south of the reservoir. We were briefed that because of this it was impossible for Navy and Marine aircraft to fly in support of the ground troops. Thus every B-26 Douglas Invader of our 452nd Bomb Wing that was flyable was armed and sent to help out. Being then based in western Japan at a former Japanese tighter base named Miho, we flew west to Korea, then turned north behind the weather front and flew to the reservoir area. With Marine ground controllers directing us, we dropped bombs, fired rockets and .50 caliber machine guns. Being told that the Chinese were hiding behind log bunkers, we dropped our napalm tanks on the hillside just above the logs, driving the enemy into the open where our troops could fire at them. For five days this situation continued (I flew as a navigator on three of those days). Our B-26s were the only combat air support our ground troops had during that brief period.

Perhaps a month later my pilot and I were on rest leave in Kyoto. Putting our bags in our Miyako Hotel room we went into a bar to plan our activities for the next couple of days. The bar was empty except for two Marine captains at the far end. As we sipped our drinks, one of the Marines came over to us. "I see you guys are Air Force. " "Right." "What kind of airplanes do you fly? " "B-26s", we replied. The drinks we had in front of us were the last we were allowed to buy. He called over the other captain and told him of our aircraft. They had both been in command of Marine companies, and they strongly asserted that they would never have been able to get their men out of their entrapment by the Chinese troops had it not been for our B-26 support during those crucial five days.

What a mutual admiration society was created during the next little while!  "How in the world can you guys sit up there at such low altitude, like ducks during open season, where anyone with a slingshot can hit you? Boy, we wouldn't have your jobs for anything!" "Yeah, but we 're dry, we turn up our heated flying suits and are comfortable, and we go back to a hot meal and warm bed. You guys down in the ice and snow and mud, nothing but cold C-rations -man, we wouldn't have your job for anything.

"Yeah, but we can hide behind rocks or in foxholes. You are there in the open, nowhere to hide!" Respect for the other man 's job. Only close combat can teach such an important lesson! No lesser experience could ever develop in me such a profound admiration for the Marine corps.

Last year I attended the reunion and dinner celebrating the 50th anniversary of the recall of the 452nd Bomb Wing (Reserve) to active duty and combat in the Korean War. Gene and Jim Hoffman deserve tremendous credit for their terrific job in setting up the meal and program.

While there, I got to dine with my former pilot and his wife plus getting reacquainted with some old friends I hadn't seen since our Miho and K-9 days. One 728th Squadron navigator 's widow came all the way from Florida to be there. So wonderful to be with old friends again!

 Tom Semans 

34th Squadron 

When I first read "Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo" I was not a pilot. Years later I reread it and winced at the author relating how he forgot to lower his flaps to the take-off setting and took off no-flaps from the Hornet. Months of intensive training in short-field techniques and he forgot flaps. Jimmie Doolittle must have cried when he read that. I wondered how he could be so stupid and then put it in writing to boot!

I was not going to submit this story, but typing up some of the other tales kind of worked me up. It's something like hearing a few jokes and then finding that you have a few to tell. So, here it is.

It was a dark and stormy night, and the typhoon circulation had brought torrential rains all day, turning Pusan East (K-9) into a big mud puddle. Projecting out of the muddy lakes were the buildings and hootches of the 34th Bomb Squadron. I sat in the hootch we called home with some other crews, waiting for them to call off the night's missions.

After the 1300 hours briefing, I had performed a walk-around preflight on my bird and the water on the pierced-steel-planking apron was over my GI shoes. The time was now coming up when I must take my navigator and gunner down to the flight line, check for changes, and prepare to blast off on a night intruder mission.

We were finally put on hold, or indefinite delay, and relaxed a bit.

Some of the navigators started to nip on the cooking sherry, but not the pilots. An hour or so later we were canceled for the night. It seems that the last pilot who tried to take off could not even see the runway lights because the water was so deep on the PSP that the props were throwing it all over his windshield. Party time had arrived!

I don't recall too much about the party except it terminated in a grand knee-deep mud-wrestling match. At 0600 I was rudely roused with the news that I had an 0700 briefing for daylight formation mission. I responded that I wasn't even a member of the daylight formation team, and was told that I had just made the team!

Daylight formation had recently been pushed on us from above over the protests of the local commanders who rightfully claimed that we could find anything at night with flares and a pathfinder without the risks of daylight exposure to ground fire and fighters. A pool of crews was selected to practice and I was not among them. I did not feel slighted. I told one of my hootch mates, who flaunted his membership on the elite team, that he would probably rue the day he had heard of daylight formation missions.

I quickly shaved, brushed the taste of two divisions of barefoot North Korean infantry from my mouth, grabbed a bite, and made it to briefing. It turned out that I was runway stand by for the flight. Not so bad after all. I would perform all preparations to go, then sit out on the runup pad sucking on 100% oxygen for my hangover until the formation took off, then back to the sack where I belonged I was listening while the formation checked in to taxi and much to my delight, they all made it. Just then something happened, and this was totally unique in Douglas A-26 history, - one taxiing plane had a wheel fall off! I fired up and blasted off with the formation.

It was a beautiful day, as the typhoon had veered and we were in the clear conditions that followed This also made it a good day for optical-sighted ground artillery. We bombed a bridge from 10,000 feet with synchronous Norden. We were just turning off target on our first dry run, when the F-80's on flak suppression reported flak at six o'clock low. This is where I was in #4 slot and I heard a loud sharp clang such as hot lead makes on stressed aluminum aircraft skin. I heard it again thirteen years later in 'Nam and recognized it instantly. It's not something you forget.

I had just flipped my bomb-bay switch and immediately noted a loss of hydraulic pressure. I notified lead and he said to start opening my bomb doors with the emergency pump. When I started this, the pump went limp and all three red dots on the emergency reservoir disappeared. The bomb doors remained closed although my bomb door spoilers (three fork-lift tines forward of the bomb bay) were down. I continued and dropped my wing bombs with the formation.

On the way back to K-9 I considered my situation. My emergency hydraulic fluid for the landing gear had evidently gone out with the bomb door fluid. This still left with me with the straight manual release and free-fall method on the foolproof Douglas A-26 Invader.

Over K-9 I performed my pre-landing check, slowed down, lowered a quarter flaps. and proceeded to pull the manual release cables for the gear. The nose gear cracked and came partially down, but the mains wouldn't budge. I had my gunner (in the right seat) try it and he couldn't get them to release. I informed lead (my Group Commander) of my situation and announced that I would try negative G's. I pulled up toward a stall and dumped the nose while my highly motivated gunner pulled on the cables with negative results.

The Group Commander called me and told me not to use negative G's anymore as it might dislodge the internal bombs, but to take it over to Miho, Japan and belly it in. Miho was our rear echelon maintenance base about one hour away just across the Korean Straits.

I made the necessary calls and headed East. I wanted to climb to 7000 feet but I ran into another problem. Old 437 wasn't going along with it. We had stayed with the formation clear back to K-9, but now it couldn't get up enough airspeed for a climb. I knew that the spoilers were still down and that the nose gear had broken loose and was partially down, but that didn't account for much drag. I kept nursing and cursing in a slow climb. At the coast, I had the navigator figure our fuel condition to Miho, using the new slow airspeed, and he came up with not much fuel left. I decided to play my trump card and use my brain on this.

Let's see now. I would plan my approach for a straight in and hold off on the flaps until damn!!! FLAPS! I reached down and flipped the flap switch up and the quarter flaps that I had been carrying during the slow climb retracted and 437 got up to speed. I had my navigator re-compute our fuel and it came up roses. I didn't burden my crew with the flap thing. They had enough to worry them.

My navigator was a recallee who wanted nothing more than to get back to his bride and insurance adjuster job in Ohio with every thing that he had brought over. He had a civilian pilot's license and would frequently entertain me with his big fantasy. I would get clobbered and he would cut me out of the pilot's seat and bring the plane back and make hero.

He was a devout coward on the ground, but would coolly give me ½ degree heading corrections on a bomb run through the night flak. My gunner was also a one termer who just wanted to get back to the golf course. He rode right seat on most missions as on this one. The navigator was in the nose but I moved the gunner into the jump seat and brought the navigator up the crawl way into the right seat as we crossed the straits.

I tried to keep up spirits (my own as well as the crew's) as we bore Eastward. We could hear another A-26 call Miho tower with an unsafe gear light and I told the crew to just wait until we called in and we all got a big laugh.

I finally got close enough to contact Miho tower. My transmission went something like this, "This is Richman 74. I have no hydraulic pressure, my landing gear will not release, my bomb bay will not open, I have six internal 500 pound GP bombs, and I'm going to crash land on your field." They replied. "Stand by one."

A new voice came on the air. This was one of the pilots who had completed a combat tour and was now at Miho for maintenance test work. He wanted to know if I was going to blow up on the runway which he felt I was sure to do if I bellied in with a load of Tritonal bombs. I told him that I was open to suggestion.

His suggestion was that we stay at altitude while he got the crash boats out and then bail out. Miho was on a very narrow isthmus, and the chance of hitting land on bailout was minimal. I decided to go with it, as he seemed to know his material.

The A-26 did not have a good bail out history, The spoilers precluded the other crew members from dropping out of the nose. We would all have to go out the top. This consisted of diving toward the wing fuel cap and rolling in a desperate attempt to miss the tail. I remembered that I had brought my movie camera and the navigator had used it up in the nose. Besides not wanting to lose the camera, I figured that I could stuff it under my flying suit and, if it didn't rip out on chute opening, take some hot movies while floating down to Miho Bay. I asked my navigator about my camera and he got a funny look on his face and pointed forward. I told him to go get it. He said no way and offered himself up to any kind of courts-martial I had in mind. In fairness to him, he would have had to crawl back through the tunnel to get it and our fuel quantity indicator needles were both bumping against the empty mark.

Before a serious military discipline situation blossomed, another voice called from the tower. The expert had evidently been retired. My Group Commander had, immediately upon landing, conferred with maintenance and armament and confirmed that his decision on a belly landing was the best bet and was smart enough to figure that I might have been talked out of it and so sent me his suggestion to take it on in. This is probably why he retired as a Major General.

Since I feared the Group commander above all else, I agreed, gave my crew the option of bailing out (rejected) and let down for the landing. As I turned on base leg the tower told me to extend my base leg as they wanted to evacuate the GCA shack, but I told them that I was on the fumes so we all had to take our chances.

I was glad to have the decision-making behind me. The bombs were supposed to be safe for a four foot free fall, the arming wires were in them, and if it was a bad enough landing to set them off, it wasn't going to be much fun anyhow. I also agreed with the tower to land on the sod alongside the strip, although I wouldn't have done that with other aircraft.

My navigator kept bugging me down final to let him jettison the canopy but I held him off to just short of round out. It dinged him on the head when it dished but I was short enough to miss out on that. As we came across the field boundary, I cut the mixtures and eased back.

I was soon aware of the tail skid dragging. Then the belly and rear of the nacelles touched down with some deceleration. Then the free rotating props started hitting, the plane settled forward on the nacelles, and we had much more deceleration. About that time the right prop stopped straight down and started shooting up a geyser of dirt that came right down my neck. It felt mighty good! Just before stopping, the plane made an almost 90 degree turn and my crew shot out like partridges.

One of the Japanese firemen handed out my movie camera and my navigator started muttering. I told him that the government would give me another navigator but not another camera.

That night we were guzzling Sapporo beer at the Golden Bear dance hall and my crew was living it up. I couldn't get too happy because I kept thinking about an alternate scenario. We are out of gas fifty miles short of Miho, I'm getting ready to bail out the crew and reach down to lower flaps when I discover the quarter flap setting! This was a very sobering consideration that no amount of Sapporo beer could dispel.

I don't know the full cause of my problems. The emergency fluid should have stayed in the baffled reservoir, but it could have siphoned out because a 40mm hit had mangled the bomb door cylinder and exited through the vacant rear gunner's compartment. The gear uplocks released by cable in the hanger. There was no sudden stoppage on the engine, so they made a run out check on the prop shaft, replaced the props, and flew 437 gear-down to Kisarazu, a depot across Tokyo Bay from Yokohama.

In 1958 1 saw a bunch Of A-26's on the apron at Tachikawa in flyable storage, and there was a 437 out there with a hard nose. It was probably the same plane.

I can still say (unlike George Bush) that my crew members always made it back without a scratch. I am more thankful than boastful about it because deep down in my heart I still remember those flaps.

The Plane and the Crew. A/2C Robert Ward(G), Thomas Seamans (P), Donald George (N/B) 

Ben Gardiner

Armament Chief 729th Squadron - 452nd Bomb Wing Korea

Fortunately or unfortunately I was selected to be in the advance group of personnel to fly to our designated base, Itazuke Japan. There were only three of us from the 729th Bomb squadron, Major Maddux, myself and one other enlisted man, can't remember his name. We were there waiting for those first planes to arrive. They were in fine condition and the crews were very eager to go on their first mission. I was the only 729th armament man available to load these aircraft so I had to find help. As you stated, the rest of the Wing was on it's way by slow boat.

 

The bomb load for the first mission was to be 260 pound fragmentation bombs which contained composition B powder. Typically this type of bomb was used for medium to high level raids because of the sensitivity of this explosive. Composition B will explode on contact with the ground with or without a fuse. We sent two aircraft out on this first mission and then waited for the results. The results were two flying sieves, they had holes in the wings and the fuselage, large and small and one hell of a lot of them. They had gone in on a strafing run and decided to drop their bombs at ground level not realizing that they might blow up on contact. We had to send both aircraft to the Tokyo repair group to have them recycled. These were just the first that we sent to Tokyo, there were quite a few more sent as Korean War progressed

Note:

LTC Walter S King, CO 13th Bomb Squadron was killed on 2/21/51 when some Comp B ,1000# bombs were dropped on a low level mission, exploded on contact and destroyed the A/C.

High Tech Bombing in Korea

In so far as B-26 crews were concerned 'high technology' and 'Korean War' were an oxymoron. The one exception was SHORAN (SHOrt RAnge Navigation), a beacon navigation and bombing system introduced during the closing days of WWII in the ETO. SHORAN was initially installed in B-26's in January 1951, but it was not until 2/17/51 that the B-26's flew the first SHORAN missions in Korea. It was something less that satisfactory due to:

• (a) ground stations located too far from the targets,
• (b) inadequate maintenance of both ground and airborne equipment,
• (c) insufficient training of operators and maintainers
• (d) inadequate geographical knowledge of Korea, among other things.

Until the MIG's drove the B-29's from the daylight skies, the SHORAN system languished in neglect. In June 1951 when the B-29's switched from daylight to night operations, SAC became interested, and when SAC became interested in any project, improvements were generally forth coming. As a result of SAC intervention, the ground stations were moved to islands off the west coast and to mountain tops just behind the battle lines in eastern Korea (closer to the targets), maintenance and maintainer training were improved, better geographical information was obtained and operator training was improved. In addition the computation of critical bombing parameters was concentrated in the Tokyo area were better facilities were available. By November 1952 these changes had developed SHORAN into a reliable accurate blind bombing system which was used by B-29's and B-26's for the remainder of the war.

 

By January of 1953 the Korean War had settled into a WWI type of fixed battlefront and the primary objective of allied forces was to reach a peace settlement which retained the integrity of South Korea. In a stagnant war, well-defended strong points are the norm, and the main UN objective was to prevent the enemy from building up to the point he could launch an all out victorious offensive. The CCF and NK forces took advantage of the "peace talks" to re-supply and re-stock their war material. One of the methods used by the CCF was to locate the main supply points close to POW camps to discourage bombing attacks. Another objective of the CCF and NK forces was to re-establish airfields in North Korea, so that just prior to the armistice an overpowering AF could be stationed in North Korea. By mid April 1953, photo recon showed that there were 200 IL-28 twin engine jet bombers stationed in Antung just across the Yalu from Sinuiju. Countering these objectives, the USAF initiated a sustained airfield campaign and a sustained interdiction campaign. Precision results were obtained by relying on the SHORAN system. The B-26 force was used to supplement the B-29 force because the number of B-29s (with its 12 sorties per night capability) did not provide for a sufficient number of sorties to keep all of the airfields neutralized. In addition, the B-26 SHORAN attacks could be used to lure the MIGs away from the more vulnerable B-29s. The CCF was developing an effective night-fighter capability against the B-29s, which was ineffective against the B-26s, because of their small size and lower operational altitude.

In March 1953, Fifth Air Force concentrated the B-26 SHORAN capability in the 17th Bomb Wing, and initiated extensive training of the SHORAN Operators for a proposed maximum effort beginning in May, in support of precision interdiction and airfield destruction. Being an engineer I was fascinated by the" high tech" SHORAN system and believed that its precision capability made trips up "North" more worth while; therefore I volunteered to become SHORAN qualified. Because SHORAN targets were considered more difficult and escape from the SHORAN compartment of the B-26 was considered improbable if not impossible in case of emergency, Shoran operator was an all-volunteer endeavor. Even when the May/June offensive came and emphasis of the B-26s shifted from night interdiction to close air support, the level of the SHORAN effort in the 17th Bomb Wing stayed at a 10 to 12 % of all missions.

Note: The WWII 17th Bomb Group flew some of the earliest SHORAN missions during WWII.

C.O. Smith ex-NAV-BOMB

37TH Bomb Squadron, 17TH Bomb Wing (L/NI)

During the late spring and early summer of 1953, the ChiComs made every effort to take advantage of the unusually heavy monsoon season to re-build airfields and to build up supplies for one final offensive. Visual night or day interdiction missions were severely handicapped by the bad weather. SHORAN, a blind bombing system used by both the B-26s and the B-29s proved to be a very valuable asset to the Fifth AF and FEAF

 

SHORAN is an acronym for SHOrt RAnge Navigation and is the name give to the precision radar beacon type electronic navigation/bombing system used by both the B-26 and the B-29 for precision bombing in the Korean War. Its origin lies in WWII, when the Army Air Force was striving to develop an accurate navigation system for flying in the often less than ideal European weather. In 1943, an early system was demonstrated to the 8th Air Force in the UK and was well received. Unfortunately all experienced engineers and technicians involved in the design and development of the system were killed a plane crash in Newfoundland on the return flight from the UK. The System had to be reconstructed and redesigned from the hand written notes and sketches left by the original design crew -a long-term tedious operation. Do to its short inherent range (~300 miles) it was not used extensively in the European theater; though it did receive use in the Italian theater by the 17th Bomb Group (M) where it proved to be very accurate and successful and in addition permitted the bombing of targets not achievable with visual bombing.

The system requires an airborne AN/APN-3 set and two AN/CPN -2 or -2A ground stations. The airborne equipment consists essentially of a transmitter, a receiver, an Operator's Console FIG 1 and a K-1A bombing computer FIG 2.

 

Figure 1: Operator's Console

 

Figure 2: K1-A Bomb Computer

 

The transmitter alternately transmits pulses to one of the two ground stations and, the system by measuring the elapsed time between transmitter pulse and the returned signal, computes the range (in Statute miles) to the interrogated station. While the system was designed primarily as a navigation system, it was soon recognized that its inherent accuracy could be used to perform "blind" bombing with a degree of accuracy previously unattainable. Integrating the K-1A bombing computer with the previously designed navigation system produced the SHORAN as we knew it in Korea. shows the basic principle of SHORAN and some of the required information.

 

Figure 3:Basic SHORAN

 

By design, when facing the target and standing on a line joining the two stations the Low Frequency Station always lies on the left, and the High Frequency Station always lies on the right. Computing the SHORAN distances from the LF Station and the HF station required and exact knowledge of the geographical position of the stations and the target. The technical details of computing the bombing parameters are beyond the scope of this article, the purpose of which is to describe its use on SHORAN bombing missions in Korea. When installed in the B-26, the gunner's station and the upper and lower turrets are removed. 

 

Figure 4

 

The upper turret is replaced by a dome, which can be distinguished from the upper turret by its larger, higher domed shape (in which the transmitter is installed) and the lack of gun barrels. The Indicator, receiver and K-1A Computer are installed on the left side of the gunners compartment facing the right side of the A/C. The bomb bay opening is sealed with a metal plate in which there is a 4'x4' opening so that the SHORAN operator, could observe the fall of the bombs from the bay and ensure that all bombs had fallen clear during a bomb run. The operator faces forward and operates the system over his left shoulder, for there is not enough room for him to turn and face the equipment. The only means of entrance or egress is through the gunner's right side access door. Entering or exiting the compartment is difficult. To enter, the operator stands on a ladder, opens the right side door, removes the seat, puts his parachute in, climbs into the compartment, puts on his chute, then receives and installs the seat. Egress is the reverse. Under emergency conditions the operator is to jettison the door, jettison the seat and exit via the door.

All of these features can be seen in FIG 4 (above).  The large dome replaces the upper rear turret. In the picture the tech is removing the K1A Computer

LIMITATIONS

There are certain inherent limitations that must be understood so that the effects of the limitations can be minimized to the greatest extent possible:

1. The Maximum range is ~= 300 STATUTE miles (radio path must be clear)
2. No more than 20 A/C may interrogate a pair of stations
3. Complex parameter calculations made prior to flight must be adhered to during the bomb run. (The bombing parameter calculations are based upon the aircraft maintaining the predicted TAS {true air speed} and bombing altitude.)
4. Station Angle must be between 30 degrees and 150 degrees. FIG 5 (below)
5. Exact geographical position of each of the two ground stations and the target must me known.
6. The 100 mile ambiguity must be recognized and taken into account
7. There are only four possible approaches to any one target: all predefined by the geometry of the system. (FIG 4)
8. Because the system is line-of-sight limited, the A/C must fly at altitudes above 14k feet and sometimes as high as 16K feet. An altitude not easily attainable by a fully loaded B-26 and one at which the engines must be operated at a fuel consuming "High Blower".
9. Only stationary targets can be attacked
10. An imagined shortcoming is that in keeping with USAAF practices in effect when the system was developed, all ranges are in statute miles in stead of nautical miles

Figure 5

 

The following is the description of a mission I flew on 14 May 1953.

My pilot and I reported to the 1430 briefing to find that we had been separated for this mission. He was to be an IP on a 3rd $ ride for a new crew and I had been assigned to fly as a SHORAN operator with C.I. Smith (pilot) Beryl Baker (navigator) and a 1st $ ride pilot whose name escapes me. I thought this to be unusual, for we rarely had $ riders along on a SHORAN mission. I was comfortable with this crew for C.I was an experienced WWII pilot, Beryl was a great navigator and I was a competent SHORAN operator having flown more than a few SHORAN missions. All of us were up in the 30 mission range except the $ ride pilot who was up for his first ride. We were assigned A/C #748, (See A/C Picture) a SHORAN equipped, dual control B-26C. Beryl groaned for he knew that he would have to endure the takeoff and landing strapped into the tunnel-no one was allowed in the nose on take off and there was no access to the nose from the cockpit in a dual controlled plane.

We attended the regular briefing where we heard the usual: weather briefing, intelligence briefing, aircraft and target assignment, take off times etc.

We then attended the special briefing where peculiar SHORAN information was briefed. Flimsies containing the pre-calculated SHORAN data, for the particular A/C and target were distributed. Latest target information and FLAK info was passed out. The primary and secondary routes were briefed. All sorties were individual, i.e. there were no formation drops, and each A/C made its own drop, generally in bomber stream style. We would be the last A/C in a five plane SHORAN bomber stream taking off at two minute intervals and would be the only BDA A/C .The lead and final A/C were usually both tagged with BDA requirements. Our target for the night was an airfield at Sondokchong-Ni, which lay on the East Coast half way between Wonson and Hamhung. (See Mission Map) There had been definite signs that the ChiComs were activating this airfield. The Navy had attacked the airfield but the FLAK was too heavy for daylight, low -level fighter-bomber attacks. The FLAK was primarily automatic fire so should not reach our altitude - or so we were told. Our mission was to destroy as much as possible of the airfield, and to drop five hundred pound, long -delay fused bombs. We were to use approach No. 3 (See Mission Map), which would bring us in from the northeast in an attempt to surprise the ChiComs. In Addition the #3 approach brought us down the strip where a string of bombs would do the most damage. Our bomb load would be 4 - 500# GP wing bombs and 6 - 500GP # bombs in the bomb bay. (See A/C Picture) The bomb bay bombs would be fused with the M124A1 long delay fuses set to explode form 4 to 12 hours after impact. We were to release the wing bombs first, so that the Instantaneous-Non-delay fused bombs did not detonate the long delay fused bombs. In addition we would carry two photoflash bombs one on each wing for BDA purposes. The photoflash bombs automatically triggered the K-14 BDA camera.

SHORAN Mission Map

 

A SHORAN A/C

An hour and a half prior to take off, we, the four man crew (pilot, copilot navigator, SHORAN operator), reported to the equipment shack, picked up parachutes, survival kits etc. and went in for a last minute intelligence briefing to see if the situation had change since the afternoon brief. At that time we discovered that out right seat pilot was to be none other than Col. Wasem, the wing Commander. I do not know why he chose to fly this mission- but 2nd Lts don't ask a Colonel "Why?' We then proceed to the plane for the preflight. All four participated in the preflight - four pair of eyes was better than one or two. We inspected the bomb load to determine that we had the load that was briefed. Just before entering the aircraft, the navigator and I removed the pins from the bombs. The arming propeller on the nose fuses for the bomb bay bombs were very carefully safety wired so that the nose fuses would not arm and the bombs would appear to be duds. (Early on we just left the plugs in the nose, but if the maintenance crews dug the bombs out and saw plugs, they recognized the rear fuses as the LD type.) The long-delay fuses were equipped with an anti-withdrawal feature so if an attempt were made to disarm the bomb, it would explode immediately. Externally the M124A1 looked like the M101A2 non-delay tail fuse. A discouragement for the airfield maintenance crew. Diabolic? -"War is hell".

Except for the thirty minutes of the bomb run and the thirty minutes of SHORAN checkout, the SHORAN operator is more or less a very interested passenger. Upon entering the SHORAN compartment, I perform a very limited pre-flight while the pilot, copilot and the navigator completed the cockpit pre-flight. Until take off is completed and the first power reduction the SHORAN could not be turned on. There was very little room for movement in the compartment and even less visibility, so the SHORAN operator had plenty of time to sit back and contemplate," What burst of insanity had caused him to be here?"

 

The Mission A/C

After takeoff and climb out to the first power reduction point, I energized the SHORAN and began the check out. Upon completion of the check out, I broke out my flimsy and inserted the necessary constants into the bombing computer. I then started looking for the appearance of the range and drift pips on the 100-mile scale so that I could tune the receiver and maximize the gain on each channel. I confirmed with the pilot that the set was O.K and then began the double check of the parameters inserted into the SHORAN and the K-1A computer. The navigator identified the parameter; I read back the value. Upon completion, I folded my flimsy so that the secondary approach data was visible in order to be prepared to make rapid changes if an alternate approach became necessary. The flimsy generally carried data for two approaches and bombing data (ATF and Trail) for the programmed altitude and values plus or minus 500 feet. Because SHORAN signal was by line-of-sight radio transmission, all flights were generally at altitudes greater than 14-k feet. Sometimes when making a turn at those high altitudes with a fully loaded B-26, altitude would be lost which could not be regained down the run. The operator must be prepared to reset ATF and Trail data to compensate for the lost altitude. On other occasions is would be necessary to take the alternate approach (If the ChiComs had plotted the primary approach, it might be advisable to use the alternate.) The exception was, of course, when running against airfields, the path had to parallel the runway. When making an approach on the East Coast, I always preferred Approach No 4, since it usually took the A/C over the water and after acquiring the arc the operator could generally measure the true bombing altitude using the SHORAN set (plus the fact there were no AA guns over water). Approach No. 3 required a 120-degree left turn to acquire the arc. On the West Coast, the situation was reversed. The Approach No. 1 was best with No 2 being second best. The overland approaches were best avoided because by that time (1953) the ChiComs had become rather adept at plotting the path of bombers flying the arc and they knew as well as we where the valuable targets were - so they knew where to place the FLAK.

At 1930 we began the take off roll. After leaving K-9 on a course of 000 degrees, we coasted out over Sam'chock- one of the few times we avoided Mike Roger (the LF splasher, and the 17th Bomb Wing inbound checkpoint.) I was busily checking out the SHORAN, tuning it, while watching the drift pulse. The navigator indicated that coast-out point has been reached, the pilot checks in with TDC, and turns the A/C to a course of 355, and initiates the climb to the bombing altitude of 14K feet. The pilot and the navigator are busy with their front-end duties while I switch the range knob to the 100-mile range and locate the drift marker. I perform the final receiver tuning and gain adjustment. When the range to the drift arc is less than 10 miles, I take over and have the pilot continue present course until drift marker is within one mile.

 

Figure 6: The SHORAN Picture

 

At that time I direct the pilot to turn left to a course of 210 while monitoring the position of the drift marker on the J scope. When within range, I go to the one-mile range and talk the pilot onto the arc. Once the A/C is on the arc, I switch to the 10-mile range and confirm the altitude by observing the ghost return from the transmitter. By placing this return on the reference pip, I can make a good altitude measurement. (Altitude is measured in statute miles and converted to feet). It has been a good turn and we have lost no altitude but we required a 200 foot correction. I then return to the 1-mile range and again directed the pilot back to the no-wind drift arc. Returning to the 100 mile range I place the range pip on the reference pip using the Range Position crank and start my stopwatch. I returned to the 1- mile range and again correct the course of the plane. Alternating between the 100 and the 1-mile range, I guide the pilot with GCA like commands to keep the A/C on the no-wind drift arc. When the stopwatch indicates that 1/3 of the ATF has passed, I place the range pip back on the reference marker using the Range- Rate knob. This should establish the range rate fairly closely. When the range arc gets within 10 miles, I switch the K-1A computer switch to the "BOMB" position. Alternating between the 1 and the 10-mile range I refine the range rate and talk the pilot down the arc. At 7 miles the "Seven Mile" light comes on and I call" 7 miles to target". From then on I call the range every ½ mile. At five miles from the target the bomb bay doors are opened with the accompanying buffeting and the armament switches are set for release. We open the doors early so that the pilot can settle the A/C down and get the proper airspeed. At two miles from the target I note the A/C heading and set the K-1 Airplane Azimuth control dial to this true heading value. This establishes the crosstrail correction, caused by wind, and moves the drift pip from the no-wind circle to the final arc. The pilot makes the required correction, to account for the drift. When the A/C is settled back on the arc, the "Bombs Away" light illuminates, the first photoflash and the bombs are released. I call "Bombs Away" to the pilot. With my flashlight I ensure that the bomb bay is clear and notify the pilot, "Bomb bay clear". The navigator and pilot clear the wing bombs. The pilot holds the course for thirty seconds while the second photoflash is released and the second BDA photo is taken. I now secure the SHORAN set, for we do not know how many other A/C will require the beacons that night, and sit back for what I hope will be an uneventful ride home. The pilot turns left to 090 and heads for the water. At some point, Beryl has C.I. turn South for the run home.

All in all it has been a successful run. During the run, while I was busy, I had followed the talk from the front. Evidently our plan had been successful. FLAK was moderate but inaccurate [unlike later when I revisited this area as the front end Nav/Bomb and watched a heavy {probably and 86mm) track us along the arc in a complete overcast. Evidently the fire control system could not accurately project the future position of an A/C flying a continually changing flight path]. The weather was clear, the A/C performed perfectly, the SHORAN operated as designed and we had a very smooth bomb run. The BDA photos showed good results. Landing was at 2325 - a relatively easy 3:55 mission. Not all SHORAN missions were this easy. I was pleased that every thing had gone so well with Col. Wasem on board.

I flew a combat tour as a B-26 Navigator/Bombardier in the 37th Bomb Squadron, 17th Bomb Wing at K-9 Korea from January through July 1953. Korea was a rather hostile environment, both on the ground and in the air. Living conditions were primitive and sanitary conditions were marginal as might be expected in a third world country in the midst of a war. The A/C we flew were unheated and unpressurized. The temperatures in the northern part of Korea (our operating area) often times hovered around thirty to forty degrees below zero (North Korea bordered Siberia and had weather to match). Weather on the K-9 AFB was not significantly better. Attrition rate of aircrews (due to losses and rotation) exceeded the replacement rate, and even when replacement crews were available, bad weather delayed their training and introduction into the combat forces. We were flying between 800 and 1000 sorties a month with an average of 48 A/C per wing (16 per squadron) and 60 aircrews (an average of 20 crews per squadron) and even more when some big action took place. For these reasons, a sore throat or common cold rarely qualified you for a DNIF (duty not involving flying) slip. Fortunately we rarely flew high enough for this to give us ear problems. We aircrews made a habit of carrying a box of "Smith Brothers" cough drops, with pictures of the bearded Smith brothers staring sternly across the cover of the box at each other (seems to have been the only kind carried in the local BX).

Military organizations are always looking for publicity other than their ability to kill and destroy. Each squadron strives to get "one up" on his fellow squadrons, each Wing tries to get "one up" on its fellow Wings, etc. I do not know in whose fertile mind the idea originated, but the thought of a "Cough Drop Special" mission soon arose in the 37th Squadron, when he realized that we had Smiths across the aircrew spectrum. The crew picked was:

THE CREW

• Capt. E.W. Smith - the squadron IP and Ops Officer. He was a regular AF officer, a WWII retreat, and an excellent pilot who liked to get "down and dirty" and "mix it up" with the Chicoms".
• Capt. C.I Smith - another WWII retread who was an excellent pilot; destined to be EW's relief as IP when he went FIGMO
• Lt C.O. Smith (me) -another WWII retread (though my WWII experience was in the USN). I had 19 missions, was designated a lead Norden Bombardier and a qualified SHORAN operator, and the most important qualification of all, the only Smith N/B in the squadron.
• A2C Theodaore Smith - the gunner about whom I know nothing- I only flew with him the one time

THE A/C

A B-26C, tail number 44-35682. The C model was equipped with a "glass nose" and an upper turret. It also was one of the few dual controlled A/C. The right had set of controls were Control column and rudder pedals only, no brakes. The right-hand pilot could reach the control console easily for the B-26 cockpit (if I may use that politically incorrect term) was quite cozy.

THE BOMB LOAD

• WING Stations, 4 500# GPs - two per wing. Since we only had four wing stations, the 500's gave us the most bang per buck
• INTERNAL BAY, 3 tripple hung 260# frags for each of the racks on one side, and three double hung 260# frags for each of the racks on the other side.

This particular load was very good for a road recce even though it was the heaviest load we could carry and caused the A/C to gross out at about 42K #'s. In Korea we loaded the 26's heavier than they did in WWII or was called for in the DASH ONE. The double hung and tripple hung 260's allowed us to get a good spread when trying for a vehicle, while the 500's were good for anything.

THE MISSION

A low level road recce covering Routes Red 11,12,16, &17. Red 11 ran NE from Sep'ori across Singosan to Anboyn a small town just to the south east of Wonsan. Red 16 started in a SE direction from Anboyn and arced around toward the SW until it came to Hoyang. From Hoyang Red 17 continued the arc until it arrived at Sep'ori. Red 12 ran NW from Hoyan until it arrived at Singosan on Red 11. The really hot spot was Singosan, a main supply depot that was circled by 46 AA flak guns. Anboyn was a supply distribution point defended by 21 Flak AA batteries. Sep'ori was a frontline distribution point serviced by 21 Flak batteries. At Hoyang there were only 4 Flak batteries. (These numbers were of course intelligence estimates from crew reports and may not have been exact). All of these routes were in valleys surrounded by mountains rising from 3500 to 4500 ft except at the intersection of R11 and R16 at Anboyn where there was a mountain that rose to between 5500 and 7500 feet (we never really knew).

The secondary purpose was to have E.W. train C.I. as an IP in low level, night attack. The 37th was one of the two (13th BS of the 3rd BW was the other) selected by General Barcus to be THE L/NI squadrons. All other squadrons were restricted to no lower than 3000 feet. We were granted the privilege of going as low as 1500 feet . (In point of fact I don't believe that we ever got this high on the mission) The B-26's flew even when the Fighter-Bombers were grounded for weather.

THE PR PART

Because this was a PR mission and the Wing Commander and the Squadron Commander were to attend we were assigned an early (2050) take off time. We had our pictures taken in the Squadron debriefing room and at the A/C and mounted the A/C for take off.

THE EXECUTION

This was a very ordinary mission. We flew to Mike Roger (the low frequency splasher, where we were required to check inbound) turned to the NE started our decent over the Iron Triangle, until we picked up Sepo'ri, the start of R11. We cruised the routes at 1200 feet seeking targets. Because we were so low, I zeroed the bombsight, set in a fixed bombing angle and talked the pilot on to each run using the reflex sight. We expended our ordnance, were shot at at Sepo'ri, Singosan, Anboyn and Hoyang. I do not believe that the gunner got a chance to do in counter fire, because at that low level, he found it difficult to pick up a target through the periscopic gunsight. The results were 4 vehicles along Red11, two big secondaries at Singosan and a fire started at Anboyn.

After we expended the bombs, E.W showed C.I how he recommended making straffing runs. His technique was to spot a target in the gunsight, nose the A/c over to about a 30-degree angle, cut loose with the guns, gently walking the stream of fire back and forth across the road with the rudder pedals . Sitting in the nose, my job was to ensure that we stayed in the valley and to yell "PULL UP" when I thought we were getting too close to the ground.

After E.W. and C.I. had exhausted the wing gun ammo, we made one low pass from NE to SW along Red 11 and let Ted use up his ammo from the turret on Red 11. We climbed up to 7000 feet over the Iron Triangle, headed for Mike Roger, then home.

AFTERMATH

E.W. went Figmo in May and I believe he is living in northern CA.

C.I and I flew my FIGMO mission together. He went FIGMO shorly thereafter and we returned to USAJIMA on the same orders. We have been unable to contact him, so I do not know where he is.

Ted - I never knew him so have no info about him

Footnote

I met Ted Smith at the 2003 Reunion of the 17th Bomb Group in San Jose, CA. He is manager of a Wal-Mart and had forgotten the details of the mission. We only had a short time together, and I had hoped to see him again at the 2004 reunion, but he did not attend. We have been unable to locate C.I. Smith, but did locate E.W. Smith who passed away earlier this year.

C. O. Smith Ex-Navigator/Bombardier

37th Bomb Squadron, 17th Bomb Wing (L/NI) K-9 AFB Korea APO 970

I flew as a Navigator/Bombardier (N/B) with the 37th Bomb Squadron, 17th Bomb Wing (L/NI) in B-26 Invaders during the Korean War. One of the most unique missions I ever flew was a 'Navy TADPOLE.' A normal TADPOLE was a relatively simple mission. The A/C and crew took off from K-9 AFB (Pusan East) and flew to Mike Roger, the low frequency splasher, where the pilot checked in with the TADP controller. After relaying bomb load information, the pilot received and followed instructions to established the required altitude and airspeed and the N/B set up the Intervalometer (the device which controlled the timing and release sequence for the bombs). When ready the TADP 'locked on' to the A/C with the MPQ-2 radar (The Radar Bomb Scoring Radar [RBS] so near and dear to ex-SAC N/B's). The controller then directed the A/C through a series of vectors which the pilot followed to the bomb release point. When directed, the pilot or bombardier released the bombs on the call of 'Bombs Away' from the controller. After receiving targeting information and results, the crew and A/C returned to base.

On a May night in 1953, my pilot was acting as instructor to a crew making its second $ ride. My gunner had 'FIGMO'd' and I , not being on the schedule, was at loose ends. I accompanied my pilot and his charges to the 37th ready room, and watched them go through their pre-mission activities, proceed to the A/C and take off. As I left the ready room the 37th Ops Officer approached me.

'What are you doing?' he asked.

'Nothing,' I replied, ' I'm headed to the 'O' club for a couple of drinks and to sweat out my pilot's return.' (Wrong answer!)

'Where's your flight and mission gear?'

'Over there in my locker,' I replied.

'Get it out and get ready. We just got a call from Group (HQ of 17th Bomb Group) - the Navy called for a special radar controlled support mission (I assumed this to be a TADPOLE) and all the alert crews are gone. We have a pilot from Wing who can go, but needs a navigator. They have a B-26C A/C at the 95th, and it's a SHORAN bird so you don't need a gunner. Get your gear together, draw your personnel equipment and they'll pick you up in a jeep in a few minutes. You'll get briefed at the 95th. (the 95th Bomb Squadron Ready Room)'

'O. K., I'm on my way,' I replied, (thinking 'well it's a TADPOLE, an easy mission and Wallie, my pilot, won't get one up on me - one mission ahead) as I gathered my flight gear, navigation kit and drew my parachute, life vest, life raft, survival kit etc. (That didn't take long for we were not heavily equipped). The jeep arrived and I rode down to 95th Squadron ready room - another non-descript squadron ready room so common to Korean AFBs.

'Hi, I'm your pilot,' I was greeted by a Lt.Col. whom I had never seen before. (He introduced himself as 'Mike', 'Matt' or 'Mark'. To me as a recently promoted 1st Lt. who was still in awed by rank, a Lt.-Col.'s first name was 'Colonel) ' How many missions you got? Are you O.K. in the right seat? What're your quals?'

'I've got thirty missions, I fly the right seat regularly on my crew, and I'm a SHORAN qualified 1525 Nav/Bomb, Sir' I replied. What do you know about this mission? I've never flown a Navy TADPOLE before, have you?'

'Nope, I was up in Wing when the call came in, and I volunteered because I've finished my tour but like to keep my hand in the game. When I flew B-25's with the Fifth (Air Force) in the Pacific, we were always getting last minute calls like this.' he answered. His answer gave me a lot more confidence- from his answer I figured that he had flown with Kenny's 'Strafers' in the South Pacific during WWII and survived- so he must be an experienced pilot. 'The Ops Officer will brief you.'

'It should be a simple mission, ' the 95th Ops Officer said. That should have alerted me to the possibilities - but it didn't. ' You'll leave here and fly out over Sam'chock instead of Mike Roger. Your call sign will be 'Hacksaw' and you will check out and in with the TADC whose call sign will be 'Jigsaw'. After you coast out you will contact CTF 77 (the Navy Task Force) as 'Neptune' and you will be under their control from there. When released check back in with 'Jigsaw' then follow normal procedures back to K-9.' He then briefed me on, Cockerel (IFF) Settings, reference altitude (4000 feet), expected weather (good), bomb load (ten -500 # GPs - 4 on the wings and 6 in the bomb bay), and indicated that we would go inbound at 9000 feet instead of the usual 8000 feet so that we would not interfere with normal traffic. Outbound we would use the normal 7000-ft altitude. Deceivingly simple - What? So it would seem.

We proceeded to the A/C, a 95th Squadron SHORAN equipped B-26C, A/C #442 and after completing the ground and takeoff pre-flight rituals, called for clearance to the active at 2135 hours.

'King Niner - Hacksaw request access to Active?'(Pilot)

'Roger - Hacksaw cleared for active.' (Tower)

We ran through the pre-take off routine including a last minute mag check then,

'King Niner - request permission for takeoff?' (P)

'Roger Hacksaw - cleared for takeoff.' (T)

The pilot set the flaps, adjusted the props for full increase, advanced the throttles for 2700 rpm and 52' Hg manifold pressure, released the breaks and at 2145 we began our takeoff roll. I sat there with my flashlight ready in case of electrical failure and we made an uneventful take off.

'You're ten miles SSW of the field, cleared for Approach Control on 'Brown' (the Approach Control Radio frequency)' called the tower.

'Roger,' replied the colonel as he switched the ARC-3 to 'Brown' and contacted Approach Control. We circled back, passed over K-9, turned to 335 degrees and started the climb to 9000 feet.

'Approach Control - Hacksaw we're inbound,' Col. Reported.

 

'Roger. Have a good night. Approach Control out.'

'Since this is a strange A/C and we are taking a non standard route I'm going into the nose so that I can see better to navigate, and check out what's up there.' I said. Pilotage was our primary navigation method in Korea.

'Roger' replied Colonel.

I climbed through the tunnel and established myself in the navigator-bombardiers' seat. Out of habit I tuned the Norden on so as to stabilize the gyros. I then noticed the APN 718 (Radar Altimeter), we seldom had these, and turned that on and went through the normal bombardier's preflight.

'Hey Colonel -we've got a '718' up here,' I reported.

'That's great - what the hell is a '718'?' asked the Colonel

'It's a radar altimeter,' I replied. Not realizing at the time that it would play an important part in the mission. Navigation was easy as the preflight winds seemed to hold and only minor heading corrections were necessary to hit the inbound check point at Sam'chock.

'We're over Sam'chock now,' I reported, 'Turn to 010. We should be able to contact 'Neptune' in five'

'Roger,' replied Col. as he called, 'Jigsaw this is Hacksaw inbound (inbound and outbound always referred to hostile territory)'

'Roger, Make your Cockerel (IFF) crow.' (Jigsaw)

'Roger, Cockerel crow' (Col.)

'Roger, Cleared inbound - report when outbound. Jigsaw out.'

After five minutes.

'Neptune - Hacksaw checking in.' (Col)

'Roger. Hacksaw, this is Neptune 'squawk your bird'', came the reply. The Navy used different terminology.

'Cockerel crowing,' responded Col.

' Roger- read you loud and clear. Your target coordinates are Charlie Uncle xy (responded Neptune -giving us some coordinates of a position on land) and you will be under control of Neptune Four Zero.' Replied Neptune.

'You take over,' said Col to me on the intercom (I/C).

'Roger,' I replied and switched to command radio. ' Neptune Four Zero, are you TADPOLE equipped?' I queried.

'Interrogatory TADPOLE?' came the reply. (Navy jargon for 'what's a TADPOLE?') My first indication that this was not to be a normal night.

'Roger Baker Sugar (RBS) guidance equipment,' I replied.

'Negative,' came the reply. 'Can give you a vector and a mark.' Neptune Four Zero indicated that he did not have RBS equipment but would give me a course to steer and a 'mark' over the target. I was not unfamiliar with Navy jargon, having spent time in the USN during WWII.

'Standby,' I replied, and switched to I/C. 'Col I'm going to challenge. I thought this would be a normal TADPOLE'

'Roger, concur,' replied Col. ' I'll do a three-sixty.'

'Neptune Four Zero - Hacksaw - I challenge - 'Roger Fox', ' I replied after consulting my mission flimsy, selecting a two item challenge, and switching back to radio.

'Standby,' replied Neptune- followed by, ' Baker Charlie'.

'After again consulting my flimsy, I verified the challenge. 'O.K. Col. - Looks like they are for real. Let's give it a go.' I identified the coordinates from my chart and said, 'Hell Col. that's in Wonsan harbor.' Now it did not look so simple and easy. 'If we're going to do this visual, lets go to 2000 ft.' The '718' would now become very valuable.

'Roger,' replied Col.. ' Neptune Four Zero - Descending to Ref Alt minus two - over to you'

'Vector 280, range one five miles,' directed Neptune.

Neptune gave us a series of vectors, which took us just north of, Yo-do (a UN held island) in Wonsan Bay. The night, while moonless, was clear and the coastline came into view.

'Standby - Mark!' called Neptune. As I looked out the nose, just as Neptune called 'Mark' I could see some undefined assortment of something just inland of a prominent point of land.

'Roger, I have it.' (N/B to Neptune). Switching to I/C, ' Col.- do a 180 and let's go out about five minutes to set up for a good ruin.'

'Roger' Col. replied, and he started the A/C into a left-hand turn. After consulting my BIF (Bombardiers Information File) I set up the bombsight with a 2000 foot altitude dropping angle for 500 # GPs and adjusted the lighting on the Norden reflex sight.

'Let's make the run at 2000 using the PDI (Pilots Direction Indicator) and I'll drop two wing bombs.' I said.

'Roger.' (Col.)

We made a right hand turn and headed in on a 280-degree heading. After a couple of corrections from Neptune, I picked up the point of land and gave Col. steering directions to get lined up.

'Bombsight on zero- Center the PDI - Wing Bombs on,' I called.

'Roger - PDI centered -Bombs on' (Pilot)

'Clutch in,' I reported as I engaged the stabilizer clutch and adjusted the azimuth marker over the target area. Remember to double grip the rate and azimuth knob on wind corrections, I said to my self. No need to uncage the optic gyro since I am using the reflex sight'.

'On target - one minute to drop,' I said just as all hell broke loose as several streams of 'golf-balls' (fire from automatic AA guns) came streaming up.

'DAMN! They heard us coming,' I said.

'I'll take care of that,' said Col. and the whole nose of the aircraft vibrated, and I was blinded as Col. let loose with the wing guns and the two bombardier compartment nose 50's. I managed to make out what looked like a target and let go two of the wing bombs.

'Bombs away-BREAK LEFT!' I yelled. We promptly went into a hard left turn and went back into the direction that we came as I de-clutched the Stab.

'See anything?' asked Col.

Looking back as best as I could I saw a couple of secondary explosions and a fire starting.

'Looks like we had a couple of secondaries and a fire,' I replied.

' I want to try to skip bomb a couple on the next go,' said Col.

'What do you need? I asked.

' I need to get down to 1000 feet and have you line me up on the target, then I will take it from there,' (Col.).

'O.K I've got the '718' on - let down on the outbound leg after we cross Yo-do, do a one-eighty and I'll take you just North of the island and get you lined up. And turn those nose guns off - they blind me and shake hell out of this compartment' I had not flown a strafing mission with nose guns in a 'C' model before. Most of them had been removed in the 37t h A/C. I would have rather had those two guns in a lower turret manned by a gunner who could have given us flak suppressing fire as we pulled off the target than in the nose.

'Roger'(P)

We let down to 1000 feet as I fed the absolute altitude from the '718' to Col.. He noted his pressure altimeter reading and used that as a reference. When we reached 1000 feet, we turned back toward Wonsan. I picked up the target area, which was simple as the fire was still going. I zeroed the bombsite and using the reflex sight as a reference talked Col. on to the target.

' I have it in my gun sight now - sit back, enjoy the ride and I'll show you how to skip bomb'. (Col.) What else could I do at this point?

I watched the target through the reflex sight - just short of the bombsight release point, Col released the two remaining 500's from the wing. I could see them hit, as Col. again exchanged gunfire with the AA batteries. Even the wing guns had an adverse effect on night vision. We broke right, made a tight climbing turn, and headed out to sea.

'See anything?' he asked

'Yes sir, I think that you hit an embankment or build-up prior to the target. I think that we are better off with the Norden,' I reported after seeing explosions short of the target.

'Let's turn north and come in on a southerly approach on the next run to see if we can fake out the gunners,' I suggested. ' I believe that if we go in at 2000 we will clear the terrain and I can see the target by locating the fire.'

'Roger- you got it'. (P)

We proceed northeast and made a left had turn while climbing to 2000 feet. We then turned to 190 and started in again. I was able to spot the fire, so I zeroed the bombsight and requested.

'Center the PDI.'

'PDI centered.' (Col.)

'Clutch in - follow the PDI,' I instructed and started another run. ' Drift killed, Bomb doors open. Looks like a good run. Damn! - they must have spotters up north - I just saw a warning stream of 'golf balls' off the right wing. They'll be expecting us.' The CCF stationed spotters along expected routes, who signaled incoming A/C by firing guns into the air - crude but effective.

Sure enough, as we approached the target - up came the 'golf balls'. They seem to be putting up a relatively heavy barrage but I do not believe that they could see us. Col. again laid down suppressing fire with the wing guns. Things quieted down a bit.

'Bombs away! Doors closed' I called as I let three of the internal five hundreds go in quick succession. ' Break right - roll out on 090'.

This took us out to sea again. As we turned I strained to see results. There appeared to be three more secondaries and the fire got larger.

'Good results - three secondaries and fire getting larger. Looks like ammo going off.' I reported. 'Let's go south and come in directly over Yo-do and maybe they won't hear or see us until too late,' I recommended.

'Roger.'(P)

We headed out on course 100, then turned back on course 330 that would take us directly over Yo-Do. I spotted the fire, zeroed the bombsight and gave heading changes until we were headed for the target.

As we passed over Yo-do I called 'Open the doors - bombsight centered - center the PDI.'

' Roger - PDI centered - doors open'

'Clutch in - follow the PDI' as I adjusted the azimuth and drift. The fire illuminated the target. It was a good run. 'Bombs Away - Doors closed,' I called as I released the last three 500's. It wasn't until then that the golf balls started coming up as they hunted for us in the night sky. We had come in undetected and they were just fishing for us.

' Break right! Climb! All bombs are gone,' I reported. 'Let's check out and go home.'

'I still have some ammo left for the guns,' replied Col.

'With all due respect, Sir, I think five low level runs over the same target are probably four too many and six may be more that Too Many.' was my response.

'You're probably right,' replied Col. ' Lets check out with Neptune and go home.'

'Sounds good to me!'

'Neptune Four Zero -Hacksaw -checking out. Five secondaries - Looked like ammo exploding and fires burning. Ordnance expended. What was the target?' Col. contacted Neptune and reported.

'Target was shore battery and triple A emplacement that have been giving the 'Little Boys' (destroyers) and the 'Big Boys' (cruisers) and other friendlies a bad time. Thanks and Good Night. Out' came the response from Neptune.

'Take a heading of one eight zero until we get close to land, then we'll turn to one seven zero and follow the coast to K-9' I advised Col.

'Roger'

As we neared the coast, I spotted the searchlights on the front line, steered us close to land and then called for a course change to 170, to take us down the coast. We continued down the coast until we were south of the searchlights, then I advised:

' Col. we're south of the front, we can probably turn on the running lights so that we can be seen by other A/C and you can probably check in with Jigsaw. I'm coming back into the cockpit for landing'

'Roger,' acknowledged the colonel, as he switched to command radio and contacted Jigsaw.

'Jigsaw - Hacksaw checking outbound - with lights.'

'Roger Hacksaw - make your Cockerel crow,' responded Jigsaw.

'Have you loud and clear. Be Advised you have traffic - five miles ahead at 'Ref Alt' plus three. Good Night - Out'

We continued down the coast and when adjacent to K-3 MCAS contacted K-9 approach control, who directed us to a GCA controller for a GCA approach and landing. We made every landing a GCA approach to give both the pilots and the GCA crew the practice for the time that your would really them.

After the landing and debrief we returned to quarters. I recommended that for future missions like this, A/C be selected that had a lower rear turret and a gunner. Another mark on the wall.

EPILOGUE:

I never learned the Colonel's name for I did not frequent Wing HQ and the senior officers had they own quarters and bar in the 'Castle' off base. The June offensive picked up the 'op tempo' so I was quite busy for a time. In the 'O' club a couple of months later, I talked to a Lt. from Wing and asked him about the colonel. He did not know who the colonel was but had heard that a Lt. Col. had been transferred to FEAF HQ because he was flying missions when he was not supposed to be. By that time there had been a complete change over of personnel in HQ.

It was years later that I discovered that this was not an unusual type of mission. The 37th Bomb Squadron, having been designated as the 17th's low-level Night Intruder specialists, did not normally fly these missions. I recently had contact with a gunner (Bob Pruett) who flew several of these missions. In Wonsan harbor there were several islands that were held by the UN forces. In defense of these islands the Navy ships frequently engaged in gunfights with the CCF shore batteries. When there was a particularly bad fight (as when the CCF brought up several 155mm batteries, defended by FLAK) the Navy would call in a B-26 strike because of its large bomb load compared to a Navy fighter or attack plane of the day. I personally could not see the difference between one B-26 with ten bombs, and five F-4U's with two bombs each - except that I was in the B-26.

As an aside, I had a great deal of trouble getting credit for the mission. It was not finally credited until I had returned to the USA and was serving as a SAC N/B in B-47s with the 310th Bomb Wing (M/Jet). The confusion of war, the hurry up nature of the mission and the involvement of several organizations added to the delay, I suppose.

It was an interesting mission, but I never flew another one.

Captain George Goddard

37th Bomb Squadron - 17th Bomb Wing

K9 Korea APO 970

At the time we were operating out of K-9 otherwise known as ‘Pusan East and to us as Dogpatch. Company Grade officers were housed in tar-paper barracks with composition roofs built of wood from old bomb crates. Each of the buildings had four bays and each bay had 8 cots. In my room there were two crews of three officers each, plus the Squadron Adjutant and myself, the Squadron Material Officer.

I flew several missions with each crew but my first was a wild one with Sheehan's crew where he got into a fight with a ground ack-ack gun, which was a draw. The mission with the sink was the crew’s 50th and for several days we tried to think of an appropriate finale. We finally came up with the idea of dropping the kitchen sink since we had dropped everything else. Of course the Koreans didn’t normally have such hardware so I got the guys in the shop to make one.

To make it better, the mission came up on the Fourth of July. As you can see in the 2nd picture (Not available), our armament guys used two 500 pound GP bombs to anchor the sink and then ten 250-pounders to complete the internal load.

We took off in Tail number 366 as the first plane in the squadron at 18:00 and crossed the front line about an hour later. It was just at dusk and by changing speed and altitude and direction we confused the radar guns to the point they never fired. Our mission was interdiction on one of the routes from north to south on the East side of the peninsula.

We cruised up and down the roads for about half an hour before we found a convoy and attacked the trucks, first with our four 500 pound wind bombs and then with our sink and the two 500-pounders. They failed to drop and we were really worried. If we did not get rid of our load we would have to fly to Miho, Japan to land since we would not be allowed to land at K-9 for fear that damaging the only runway, shutting down the Group. Court Marital-and possibly prison time were also certain.

Fortunately, on the second try, with a little shaking, the load dropped and we breathed easy. So by 22:30 we were in the club enjoying a 50-mission party.

 

 The Kitchen Sink

 

 Maiden's Delight

BACKGROUND

I flew 50 combat missions in Korea with the 37th Bomb Squadron, 17th Bomb Wing (L/NI) as a Navigator-Bombardier in B-26 Aircraft from January 1953 through July 1953. I entered Korea as a 2Lt. and left as a 1 Lt. The intent here is to describe conditions and equipment as I knew them and to provide a brief summary of some pertinent air war facts.

AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

There were generally three different configurations of aircraft: early, intermediate and late. The early aircraft were characterized by a "flattop" in which only the right half of the canopy hinged up from the front for entry into the cockpit. These were not used in combat in my period since escape under emergency conditions was difficult, if not impossible. The only flattop that I ever flew was in the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Langley AFB during training. The later or "clamshell" A/C had a left and right canopy which hinged at the bottom and opened from the center. A jettison mechanism was incorporated so that the shells could be jettisoned in an emergency.

Armament

• Guns
  • B-26B Hardnose
    • 6 Staggered 50 Cals (early)
    • 8 inline (vertical)
  • B-26C - Glass nose
    • Two in the lower right side of the N/B compartment (rare in 37th) These guns were generally removed because firing them would sometimes cause the N/B enclosure to fracture
• Wing
  • 8 in two gun packages - 1 or 2 packages per wing (hand charged)
  • 6 in 3 gun clusters in each wing (remote charged)
  • Rear
    • 2 guns per turret - 2 turrets, 1 upper/1 lower (some A/C had only an upper turret) 500 rounds per gun

  These A/C could be found in any configuration, i.e., a B-26B with either of the two hard noses and any combination of wing guns. The glass nosed, B-26C, may or may not have a lower turret and may or may not have the two guns in the bombardier's compartment. Early usage and evaluation of the A/B-26 by the 3rd Bomb Group during WWII in the Pacific Area resulted in the deletion of the ventral (lower) turret. During the Korean War, it was found that having a lower turret resulted in a change in CG and a smaller bomb load. Since removal and replacement of the ventral turret was a field operation, many of them were removed.

  Bomb Racks

  • 3 - each side internal
  • 4 - 2 per wing external
  • 2 - 1 per wing photoflash
  • All A/C were equipped with rocket launch stations but were not used during my tour

  Bomb Damage Assessment A/C were equipped with auto trigger K-14 camera. A photocell detected the illumination by the flare and automatically took a picture.

  B-26 Aircraft Characteristics

  • Davis Wing
  • 2 R-2800-71 engines (water injection disabled)
  • No heaters
  • No relief tubes -(at least not for the N/B)
  • Bomb bay & Landing light problems (Bomb bay light could not be turned off in flight. Landing light could not be retracted without illumination)
  • No deicing capability
  • SHORAN equipped A/C - no rear turrets, no entrance to Bomb Bay

PHASES OF THE WAR

Phase 1 - 27 June 1950

NK army invaded South Korea and overwhelmed SK troops. Pushed back to Pusan perimeter. USAF air power played a major part in stopping NK and holding Pusan Perimeter

USAF Strength

• B-26s - 26 in 2 under strength Squadrons, the 8th and 13th, of the 3rd Bomb Group (mostly hardnose A/C)
• B-29 - 22
• F-80- 365 (short range, no rough air field capability, no bomb capability)
• F-51 -Longer range, bomb capability, rough airfield capability

During this period, the NK air Force was destroyed and played no further part in War

Phase 2- 15 September 1950

• Inchon Invasion
• 452 BombWing activated(CA Reserve - 4 Sqdns of B-26)
  • 728
  • 729
  • 730
  • 731
  • First combat 10/27/50
  • (731 transferred to 3rd became 90th BS)
• The UN Forces destroyed NK army and pushed to 38th parallel
• McArthur pushed to Yalu.
• ROK to Yalu, U. S Troops stood back so as not to constitute a threat to the Chinese

Phase 3- 27 Nov 1950 to Mid 1951

• Chinese Communist Force intervention. Pushed UN forces below 38th parallel
• Air Power destroyed supply lines and roads and inflicted heavy troop casualties on Chinese and NK forces
• Lack of FLAK or air support caused ChiComs to lose offensive initiative
• First MIGs appeared - B-29s attacked by MIGS
• F-80 and F-84 proved to be no match for MIGs
• Request by 5th AF for more B-26 Night Intruders

Phase 4 - June 1951 to Dec 1952

• Call for peace established a static front - No major offensives
• UN Forces force way to 38th parallel
• Build up in Europe continued because it was feared that the USSR would start WWIII
• Not enough to win-Enough not to lose was the philosophy that developed while the forces in Europe were built up T
• Threat (implied) of atomic weapons if Chinese used A/C from Manchuria (upset other UN countries)
• Peace talks continued at Panmunjon
• Stalemated 1951- USAF losses to date 246 A/C (33 Bombers)
• 452nd Bomb Wing moved to K-9 May 51 (deactivated May 52-converted to 17th bomb Wing)
• 3rd Bomb Wing moved to to K-8 August 51
• Chicoms build up an air force of 1050 A/C in China and Manchuria with 690 A/C in Manchuria
• October 51 B-29s restricted to Night attack - due to vulnerability to MIGs
• Chicoms resupply moved to night to avoid air attacks.
• All B-26s assigned Night Intruder duty
• As front stagnated FLAK build up so that targets were heavily defended
• According to Intelligence Data there were 788 Heavies (85mm) 1672 Automatics
• Due to increased FLAK F/B and B-26s losses increase dramatically
• Due to lack of replacment A/C B-26's were restricted to no less than 3000 Ft except 37th Bm Sq (17th Wg) and 13th Bm Sq (3rd Bomb Wing)

Phase 5 (My era) Jan 1953 through July 1953

• 5th AF called for more B-26s- to build B-26 wings to war strength (26 A/C per squadron)
• USAF unable to supply required A/C. decision
  • 17th Bomb Wing - was assigned 16 A/C per squadron
  • 3rd Bomb Wing - 26 A/C per squadron
  • USAF sent a group of obsolete A/C to Korea including some Flattops.
    • Flattops were not usable in combat.
    • Very few A/C were SHORAN equipped.
    • These were the A/C that the European Groups did not want.

  Conditions

  Weather

  • Weather unpredictable, but unusually bad.

    • Spring /summer 1953- heavy monsoon season.
    • Heavy clouds made night operations extremely difficult. Good GCA coverage allowed B-26s to operate in adverse weather conditions.
    • SHORAN had been improved and was used extensively to compensate for inability to fly visual missions

  Terrain

  • East Very mountainous
  • West Low-lying rice fields

  Tactical Situation

  • March
    • In March all B-26 SHORAN operations were shifted to the 17th Bomb Wing with the subsequent transfer of all SHORAN equipped 3rd Bomb Wing A/C to the 17th Bomb Wing. An intensive training program was established in the 17th Bomb Wing in preparation for an intensive SHORAN campaign against NK airfields and supply points. From this time on approximately 30% of all 17th Bomb Wing missions were SHORAN.
  • June/July
    • Chicoms re-supply for offensive (large supply dumps)
    • Airfield buildup (In preparation for moving A/C in just prior to cease fire)
    • Rebuild roads, RRs and transportation system
    • After Little Switch (the exchange of sick and wounded POWs), the Chicoms launched a series of offensives in June and July to establish commanding positions along the front line. Particularly heavy attacks were launched against the ROKs at the Iron Triangle (Pyonggang area).

  An armistice was negotiated andd became effective 27 July, 1953

  U.S. Air Force strength at close of hostilities (1953)

  • B-26 128A/C 85 sorties/night
  • F-84 218 A/C 1281 sorties/day
  • F-86 F/B 132 N/A
  • F-86 I 165 143 sorties/day
  • B-29 99 12-14 sorties/night
  • TOTAL 742

  Chicom Strength (Located in Manchuria)

  • Jet Fighters (probably MIG-15s) 950
  • Prop Fighters (probably YAK-9s) 160
  • Jet Light Bombers (IL-28s) ` 100
  • Prop bombers 65
  • Ground Attack (IL-2s) 115
  • Transports 90
  • TOTAL 1480